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Abstract
This study makes use of the results of a postal questionnaire sent to a sample of large
private sector companies in Britain and France to address two key issues in the new
institutional analysis of the firm. The first is the way the institutional environment supports
and constrains the design of firm-level organisational devices and governance mechanisms.
The second concerns the relation between the introduction of new organisational methods
and the firm’s innovative capacity. Multiple correspondence analysis is used to describe the
relation between the use of innovative work methods and pay policies. The analysis shows
that the policies of the British sample of firms display greater ‘coherence’ than those of the
French sample, in the sense that a more intensive use of the new organisational methods is
more consistently associated with a more intensive use of the new pay policies. Ordered
logit regression analysis shows that UK firms with positive expenditures on R&D are more
likely to introduce new organisational methods than those not making such expenditures.
This relation between the use of new organisational methods and investments in innovative
capacity are not confirmed for the French case.
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This paper draws on the results of an on-going comparative study of the work organisation
and pay policies of large private sector British and French enterprises to address two key
issues in the new institutional analysis of the firm. The first concerns the relation between the
organisational devices firms use to manage competencies and knowledge flows and their
capacity to innovate new products and processes. A basic aim of the paper is to contribute to a
body of literature seeking to extend the established focus of new institutional economics on
the relation between governance structure and transaction costs to include a consideration of
the way organisational design is shaped by the firm’s interest in developing and making
efficient use of its knowledge base
2.
The second issue concerns the way the wider institutional environment may support and
constrain the design of firm level organisational devices and governance mechanisms. This
part of the analysis pertains to the question of market selection dynamics and to possible
limits to the diffusion of ‘best-practice’ organisational forms. It can be seen as fitting within a
tradition in comparative analysis of focusing on problems of institutional inertia and
differential competitive performance.
3
The starting point for the analysis is the widely held view that increasing international
competition based on such non-price factors as quality, design and innovation is encouraging
firms to adopt a variety of new work practices which serve to involve employees more fully in
production related decision-making. These new practices typically include the use of quality
circles or other forms of employee participation groups, the use of self-managed work teams,
the creation of project teams involving personnel from different services and multiple levels
of the hierarchy, and the enhanced use of job rotation and job enlargement. A major objectives
in adopting these practices is to increase employees’ responsibility for quality and to more
fully draw on the entire in-house stock of knowledge in an effort to increase the organisation’s
capacity for product and process innovation (see, for example, Clegg, et al., 1996; Dertouzos,
et. al. 1989; Lawler et. al, 1992; Osterman, 1994; Levine and Tyson, 1990; Lay et al. 1996;
Taddéi and Coriat, 1993; Womack et al. 1990).
                                                
2 See, for example, Foss, 1993; Langlois and Foss, 1997; Teece, 1986.
3 See, for example,  Elbaum and Lazonic, 1982; Lorenz, 1994; Robertson and Langlois, 1994.2
It can be argued that such high involvement work practices are more likely to be effective if
they are supported by forms of pay linking employees’ compensation to their effort and to
company performance. The quite plausible hypothesis is that employees are more likely to
commit themselves to the goal of improving product quality and the firm’s innovative
capacity if they are promised a share of the quasi-rents which derive from their enhanced
commitment and effort. (Ichniowski et. al., 1997; Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Levine and
Tyson, 1990).
Pay practices which support employee involvement in this manner include such collective
incentive schemes as profit sharing and gaining sharing, and such individual incentive
schemes as skill-based pay and compensation for suggestions. It has also been argued that
such policies are more likely to be effective if they are complemented by the following three
arrangements: job security in order to increase time horizons and encourage employees to
invest in firm-specific skills; compressed wage differentials in order to encourage group
cohesiveness and a sense of community; and some system of representation (works council or
local union) that assures employees that their interests will be represented in the design and
operation of the pay system (Eaton and Voos, 1992; Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Levine and
Tyson, 1990; Lorenz, 1995 ; Streeck, 1994).
4
The introduction of these complementary human resource and personnel polices may be
supported and constrained by the institutional setting in which the firm operates. Factors
impacting on company polices include the character of union policy on matters of pay and job
content, the content of collective bargaining agreements and the extent of their coverage, and
the nature of national labour legislation prescribing certain forms of remuneration and
employee representation. Unconstrained competition does not necessarily provide an ideal
environment for the diffusion of new work and pay practices. It can plausibly be argued that
employers left to their own devices will under-invest in potentially superior forms of work
organisation. Levine and Tyson (1992), for example, have argued that externalities transmitted
through the labour market may impact on the effectiveness of various personnel policies that
support high involvement work organisation. For example, the use of compressed wage
differentials may make it difficult for companies to recruit and retain qualified personnel. The
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provision of employment guarantees combined with the useof group payment schemes may
create a problem of adverse selection in the form of attracting the least motivated and the most
opportunistic workers on the labour market. Such consideration provides the economic
foundation for an argument in favour of legislation to assure the widespread adoption of new
forms of work organisation.
 5
In order to gather information pertinent to these key issues in the changing nature of company
work and pay policies, identical postal questionnaire were addressed to the managing directors
of a sample of private sector firms in Britain and France.
6 The target population was the 1000
largest enterprises in Britain and the 2000 largest in France
7. This choice was based on a
desire to investigate a population of firms highly integrated into the international economy,
facing the kinds of competitive pressure that the literature has argued are encouraging firms to
restructure their work systems. The response rate to the questionnaire was approximately 10
percent in each country, providing 103 useful responses for the UK and 202 useful responses
for France.
A core section of the questionnaire was devoted to asking for detailed information on the
extent to which different occupational groups were implicated in various new work and pay
practices. These questions asked for information similar to that provided by Oliver and
Wilkinson (1992) in their survey of Times 1000 firms, and by two broad coverage surveys
based on on-site interviews: the ‘Enquête Réponse’ undertaken by DARES (1994) at the
French Ministry of Labour, and the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in Britain co-
ordinated by Milward et. al. (1994). 
8.
Our survey design differs in an important respect from these surveys in that it not only asks
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Centre in the UK. Bruno Sire of LIRHE, University of Toulouse took responsibility for co-ordinating the
French survey. The author express his gratitude to the French research team for allowing results based on their
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7 Dunn and Bradstreet’s Marketing Service provided the company names and addresses for the British study.
8 The coverage of these surveys is considerably wider than ours, the DARES survey being addressed to a sample
of firms with 25 or more employees and the WIRS in Britain being addressed to a sample of firms with 25 or
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whether a particular practice is used, but also what percentage of various occupational
categories are actively implicated in its use.
9 The failure to ask for this information has
arguably generated exaggerated estimates of the degree to which firms in Britain and France
have transformed their work and pay practices. The figures presented in Tables 1.2 through
1.5 below indicate that a sizeable proportion of the firms which report having introduced new
work and pay practices involve less than 33 percent of their employees in their use. This
suggests a conclusion comparable to that of Applebaum and Batt (1994) for the US based on
their review of the literature. A large proportion of the firms that are introducing high
involvement practices in Britain and France are doing so on an experimental or incremental
basis rather than engaging in a wholesale transformation of their human resource system.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the survey to the state of our knowledge of
organisational change in Europe is the light it sheds on differences between Britain and
France. Despite the large number of surveys undertaken on these issues in both countries,
10
differences in methodology and objectives preclude making reliable cross-country
comparisons.
11 The use of identical questionnaires in two countries provides a more reliable
basis for identifying international differences and for making plausible conjunctures
concerning the impact of the national institutional setting on company organisational design
and governance.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. The first contrasts the extent to
which shop floor operators in the sample of British and French firms are involved in a set of
key new work and pay practices. The second section uses a simple data reduction technique,
multiple correspondence analysis, to identify associations in the use of work and pay polices
as well as their levels among firms in each country sample. The theoretical considerations
briefly laid out above suggest that firms actively introducing high involvement work practices
would have an interest in adopting appropriate incentive and governance mechanisms. The
                                                
9 In this respect our design is comparable to that developed by Lawler et al. (1992) in their survey of Fortune
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For a general discussion of European developments, see Coriat (1998).
11 For example, the recent ESRC sponsored study of new work practices in manufacturing undertaken by Clegg et
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ranging from  ‘a little’ to ‘entirely’.  The meaning of such subjective judgements is difficult to interpret and
provide a poor basis for solid international comparisons.5
analysis presented in this section provides a means of determining whether this ‘institutional
coherence’ can be observed in practice, and provides a further basis for interpreting the impact
of the institutional setting on the firm’s organisational design. The third section turns to the
relation of the use of innovative work practices to innovative capacity. It presents the results
of an ordered logit regression relating the use of new work practices to levels of expenditure
in R&D and to certain strategic policy decisions including whether or not the firm has sought
to diversify its product range.
The Use of High Involvement Work and Pay Practices
The figures presented in the tables below pertain to the 103 British respondents and 202
French respondents which provided completed responses to the section of the questionnaire
asking what percentage of various occupational categories were actively involved in certain
new work and pay practices. The size of the British respondents in terms of employment
ranged from a low of 275 employees to a high of 87000, with a median of 1325 and a mean of
4339. For the French sample of firms, the size ranged from a low of 115 employees to a high
of 190,600, with a median of 1096 and a mean of 4731.
12
The firms on average were highly integrated in the international economy. Exports accounted
for 35 percent or more of annual turnover for over 50 percent of the French sample. For the
top quartile of the British sample, exports accounted for 40 percent or more of turnover. A
majority of the respondents in each country claimed that competition from overseas producers
had increased over the last three years. Approximately 40 percent of the British firms ranked
the importance of quality as high or very high in the competition they faced from overseas
producers, and 25 percent ranked innovation of high or very high importance. The respective
figures for the French sample of firms were 75 percent and 55 percent. Table 1.1 below gives
the distribution of the sample firms in each country by broad industrial sector.
                                                
12 The presence of a tail of firms in each country reporting employment levels of under 500 employees can be
accounted for by the fact that number of the respondents answered on-behalf of the production site rather than
on-behalf of the company as a whole.6
Table 1.1
Distribution of Enterprises by Industrial Sector
Sector Britain France
Consumer Goods 12.6% 10.8%
Industrial Equipment 16.5% 21.1%




1.Other refers to agriculture and food processing, energy, gas and electricity, and
construction and public works.
Tables 1.2 though 1.5 show the extent to which production workers are involved in four work
and four pay practices that are often identified in the literature as forming the heart of the new
high involvement human resource system.
13 These include the work practices of job rotation,
self-managing teams, quality circles and multi-disciplinary project teams, and the pay
arrangements of gain sharing, profit sharing, skill-based pay and compensation for
suggestions.
Table 1.2
Britain: Use of High Involvement Work Practices
Percentage of employees
implicated in practice:
0% 1-33% 33-66% 66-100%
Practice: Percentage of  firms reporting each level of use:
Job Rotation 23% 57% 12% 8%
Self-Managing Teams 18% 56% 14% 12%
Quality Circles 18% 55% 19% 8%
Multi-disciplinary Project
Teams
16% 60% 16% 8%
Number of respondents: 103
                                                
13 See, for example Florida (1995) and Osterman (1994).7
The British figures on the use of self-managing team organisation are close to those reported
by Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) who found that 85 percent of TIMES 1000 firms were
making use of such methods. They show a more intensive use of quality circles, as Oliver and
Wilkinson (1992) reported that 68 percent of Times 1000 firms made use of this practice. The
percentage figures for France for these two practices are broadly consistent with those
reported in the 1993 DARES survey which found that for firms employing over 1000
employees 67 percent were making use of quality circles and that 51 percent were making use
of project teams.
Table 1.3
France: Use of High Involvement Work Practices
Percentage of employees
implicated in practice:
0% 1-33% 33-66% 66-100%
Practice: Percentage of firms reporting each level of use:
Job Rotation 41% 24% 15% 20%
Self-Managing Teams 58% 22% 10% 9%
Quality Circles 45% 24% 17% 14%
Multi-disciplinary Project
Teams
43% 42% 8% 7%
Number of respondents: 202
The most striking observation concerns the comparatively low percentage of British firms
reporting non-use of the various work practices. The evident conclusion that British firms are
more innovative than their French counterparts should be qualified, however, by noting that of
those British firms using the work practices, the majority report that they involve less than 33
percent of their production workers in their use. This suggests that the majority of British
firms are introducing high involvement work practices on an experimental or piecemeal basis
rather than attempting a wholesale transformation of their production system.
14 If we focus
our attention on the higher levels of utilisation, the contrast tends to favour France. For job
                                                
14 This observation provides an important corrective to Oliver and Wilkinson’s (1992) thesis concerning a
general ‘Japanisation’ of the British economy8
rotation and quality circles, the percentages of French firms reporting that they involve over
66 percent of their workers in their use is approximately double the British figure. On these
grounds one might conclude that the French sample of firms are more innovative.
The use of job rotation in France not only stands out relative to its use in Britain but also
relative to the use of other practices in France. A possible explanation for the relatively
intensive use of job rotation in France relates to the limited scope for horizontal mobility on
the French labour market, associated with the existence of highly structured internal labour
markets in large firms. Such pay arrangements remain highly entrenched in France despite the
contemporary trend to the use of merit and other form of variable pay such as those reported
in the table above.
15
Such institutionally grounded restrictions on horizontal mobility are reinforced by legal
regulations, which add costs to laying off employees who are classified as ‘permanent’. Job
rotation may offer needed flexibility, given the limits on French employers’ ability to varying
operating costs in response to changes in demand through shedding labour. If this
interpretation is correct, then the high use of job rotation in France should be seen as a
response to political factors and the institutional setting rather than indicating a commitment
to increasing employee skills as part of a strategy of heightened employee involvement.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present comparable percentage figures for the use of pay policies, which
link compensation to various dimensions of individual effort or to collective performance. As
in the case of work practices, British firms appear more innovative in the sense that a larger
percentage report some use of the policies, while French firms can be classed as more
innovative in the sense that for the two collective incentive schemes - profit and gain sharing -
the percentage of them reporting utilisation at over the 66 percent level is greater than it is for
Britain. Gain sharing and profit sharing are also distinctive relative to other practices in
France for the extremely small percentages of firms reporting low or medium intensity of use.
                                                
15 For a discussion of these features of the French labour market, see Eustace (1998) and Marsden (1998).9
Table 1.4
Britain: Use of High Involvement Pay Policies
Percentage of employees
implicated in policy:
0% 1-33% 33-66% 66-100%
Practice: Percentage of firms reporting each level of use:
Profit Sharing 36% 33% 2% 29%
Gain Sharing 52% 44% 1% 3%
Skill-based Pay 46% 35% 2% 17%
Compensation for Suggestions 40% 28% 7% 25%
Number of Respondents: 103
Table 1.5
France: Use of High Involvement Pay Policies
Percentage of employees
implicated in policy:
0% 1-33% 33-66% 66-100%
Practice: Percentage of firms reporting each level of use:
Profit Sharing 41% 4% 1% 54%
Gain Sharing 64% 3% 2% 31%
Skill-based Pay 72% 14% 3% 11%
Compensation for
Suggestions
85% 6% 3% 6%
Number of respondents: 202
The explanation for these features of French pay policy is no doubt legislation which provides
fiscal advantages to firms that negotiate agreements for their introduction with a local union or
the comité d’entreprise for the universal coverage of employees in profit or gain sharing
plans.
16 The contrast with the relatively low use of other new pay policies by French firms
                                                
16 The ordinance of 4 January 1959 provided financial incentives for firms to link employee compensation to
company profits while the ordinance of 17 August 1967 made such pay system obligatory. See Reynaud (1975,
p. 252).10
brings out in a striking manner how government intervention can impact on company pay
policies.
Coherence in Company Work and Pay Policies
The theoretical considerations briefly outlined in the introduction suggest that firms
introducing high involvement work practices will have an incentive to adopt pay and incentive
devices designed to assure employees that they would have a fair share of organisational
quasi-rents. Such arrangements as employment security, compressed wage differentials and
some for of work place representation provide natural compliments to pay systems linking
compensation to company performance or to individual and group effort.  In this section I
consider to what extent the work and pay polices of the samples of British and French firms
exhibit this ‘coherence’ in sense that those firms making high use of the four high
involvement work practices also tend to make high use of the four pay practices, as well as
other key incentive and governance mechanisms.
 In order to do this a multiple correspondence analysis was performed on the eight work and
pay variables presented in the Tables 1.2 through 1.5. Since this technique is less well known
than principal components analysis to which it is similar in spirit, it will be useful to give a
brief account of its properties.
17  Simple correspondence analysis is a data reduction technique
suitable for the analysis of two-way contingency tables; where the rows represent different
levels of one categorical variable and the columns different levels of another. From this matrix
two clouds of points in multidimensional space can be defined consisting of the row profiles,
or the set of relative frequencies corresponding to the rows of the data matrix, and the column
profiles, or the set of relative frequencies corresponding to the columns of the data matrix.
The row (column) analysis in correspondence analysis consists in computing a lower
dimensional space (preferably no more than two or three dimensions) which is ‘closest to’ or
‘best fits’ the high dimensional cloud of points consisting of the row (column) profiles
according to the criteria of minimising the weighted sum of the squares of the chi-squared
distances between each row (column) profile point and the lower dimensional subspace. One
can then project each row (column) profile onto the lower dimensional space and look at the
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projected positions of the profiles as an approximation of their true higher dimensional
positions.
18 As in the case of principal components analysis, on can compute ‘factor’ scores
for each case or individual observation in the ‘best fitting’ lower dimensional space, to be
used as input for further multivariate analysis. One can also use the results more directly to
identify associations amongst the levels of different categorical variables, and it is in this spirit
that the analysis has been undertaken here.
Multiple correspondence analysis, also known as homogeneity analysis,
19 is suitable for
analysing the associations between more than two categorical variables. It consists in
performing a correspondence analysis on a multiway contingency table known as the Burt
matrix.
20 What the reader needs to know to interpret the lower dimensional scatter plots of the
results of the analysis are the following. Each level of each categorical variable will have a
coordinate position in the lower dimensional subspace. The co-ordinate position for a level
will be located at the average position of the co-ordinates of all the cases or individuals who
have 'chosen' that level. Similarly, the co-ordinate position for a case or an individual will be
at the average position of the co-ordinates of the levels he has ‘chosen’. In general, if the
coordinate positions of the levels or classes of two or more categorical variables are close,
they will have been chosen broadly by the same individuals. Similarly, two individuals will
have co-ordinates that are close if they have broadly chosen the same levels or classes.
21
In order to simplify the analysis of work and pay practices in Britain and France, the
categorisation of the eight work and pay variables presented in the Tables 1.2 through 1.5 was
reduced to three levels: 0 percent of production workers involved; between 1 and 33 percent
involved; and over 33 percent involved. These classes were give value labels of 1, 2 and 3
                                                
18 Usually some information is lost in the process and a measure of the accuracy of  the lower dimensional
representation is provided by a he percentage of the total  ‘inertia’ accounted by the  lower dimensional space,
where total inertia is defined as the value of the chi-squared statistic of the original data matrix divided by the
total number of observations.
19 The analysis presented here was done with the statistical package, Statbox. Multiple correspondence analysis is
also available as an option in SPSS.
20 The Burt matrix is a square symmetric matrix which groups all the two-way contingency tables for a set of n
categorical variables.  Along the diagonal  of the matrix are ‘blocks’ composed of the cross tabulations of each
categorical variable with itself. The off-diagonal blocks are formed by the cross tabulations of each variable
with the others.  The matrix is symmetric since each entry on one side of the main diagonal is identical to the
entry on the other side. See Greenacre (1993, p. 142).
21 See Lebart et al. (1995, Ch. 2).12
respectively. For both the British and the French analysis two ‘illustrative’ variables
22 have
been presented on the graphic displays. The first, GUAR, indicates whether a firm does or
does not provide its employees with formal or informal employment guarantees. The value
labels of 1 and 2 correspond to the non-use and the use of employment guarantees
respectively. Approximately 61 of the French sample of firms offered their employees formal
or informal employment guarantees while only 20 percent of the British sample offered their
employees such security. This contrast is consistent with the observations above concerning
the limited amount of horizontal mobility on the French labour market. The second illustrative
variable, CMP, provides as a simple measure of earnings dispersion: the ratio of the earnings
of the highest paid to the lowest paid full-time employee in the enterprise. The questionnaire
originally asked respondents to indicate this ration on a scale from 1/1 to 80/1. For the
purposes of the correspondence analysis this scale was divided into three classes as presented
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Earnings Ratio of Highest to Lowest Paid Full-time Employee 
Percentage of Respondents by Class
Value label Ratio Britain France
3 CMP £10/1 20% 25 %
2 10/1 < CMP £ 25/1 35% 38%
1 CMP > 25/1 44% 37%
Number of British respondents: 103
Number of French respondents: 202
A further illustrative variable, UN, was included in the British analysis to indicate whether or
not union/management productivity and quality committees were in operation. For this
                                                
22 Illustrative or supplementary variables in correspondence analysis do not contribute to the positioning of the
axes in the best fitting lower dimensional subspace. Rather, they are useful for interpreting the results. The
profiles that correspond to a particular level of an illustrative variable can be projected onto the lower
dimensional subspace as long as they are meaningful in terms of the variables on which the correspondence
analysis has been performed. Their position will then correspond to the average coordinate position of those
individuals or cases that are characterised by the particular level. See Greenacre (1993, Ch. 12).13
variable, the value label 1 indicates non-use and the value label 2 indicates use of the
arrangement
23
Graphs 2.1 and  2.2 present the scatter plots or maps for the first two axes of the
correspondence analysis for Britain and France respectively.  The illustrative variables have
been printed out in a smaller sized font in order to distinguish them from the active variables.
In the case of Britain, the first two axes accounted for 65 and 15 percent of the inertia
respectively.
24 In the case of France it was necessary to take into account the first 4 axes in
order to account for 65 percent of the inertia. The first two axes accounted for 26 and 18
percent of the inertia respectively. The third and fourth axes, which account for 12 and 9
percent of the inertia respectively in the French case, are presented in the Appendix along with
the absolute contributions of the active variables to the inertia on the principal axes for both
countries.
                                                
23 This question was not included in the French analysis since it would in all likelihood illicit unambiguous
response. The  28 October 1982 Auroux law gave the comité d’entreprise consultation rights around the
introduction of new technology. The question might be interpreted by French employers as asking whether this
right is exercised. On the other hand it might be interpreted as asking whether unions directly participate in
productivity discussion rather than through the conduit of the comité d’entreprise. For a discussion of the
legislation on employee consultation rights over the introduction of new technology, see Cam (1990) and Harff
and Henriet (1988).
24 For the definition of inertia, see footnote 18 above.14
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For the active variables, ROT refers to job rotation; TM refers to self-managing team organisation;
QC refers to quality circles; PRJ refers to multi-disciplinary project teams, GN refers to gain
sharing; PFT refers to profit sharing; SG refers to compensation for suggestions; and SK refers to
skill-based pay. The value label 3 refers to the highest level of utilisation.  For the illustrative
variables, GUAR refers to employment guarantees; UN refers to union/management productivity
committees; and CMP refers to compressed earnings differentials. The value label 2 refers to use of
the practice for GUAR and UN. The value label 3 for CMP refers to a highest degree of
compression of wage differentials.
The interpretation of the visual display for the British firms is straightforward. As regards the
work practices, the clustering of the same classes or levels of utilisation for the work variables
means that those firms which use one practice at a certain level of intensity tend to be the
same firms that use the other practices at that level of intensity. The fact that the profiles
corresponding to a particular degree of utilisation of the pay policies are clustered close to
those corresponding to the same level of utilisation of the work practices means that there is
considerable overlap among the firms concerned. Overall, the pay and manpower policies of15
British firms show substantial coherence in the sense that a high level of utilisation of the
work practices tends to go along with a high level of utilisation of the pay policies.
25
Graph 3.2
















































For the definitions of the variables, see the note to Graph 3.1 above.
The way to interpret of the French results is less obvious. The first axis, as in the British case,
appears to distinguish non-use of the practices from a low level of their use, and one can
observe a notable clustering of the profiles corresponding to the non-use of the various
policies and practices. Unlike the British case, however, the second axis does not separate in a
consistent manner the profiles corresponding to a low-level utilisation of the various policies
from those corresponding to a high-level of their utilisation. The profiles corresponding to a
low level utilisation of profit sharing and gain sharing are quite distant from the others and
they account for most of the inertia along the second axis. The lack of association between
                                                
25 The illustrative variables are not especially informative in the British case. It is interesting to observe that those
firms not making use of union/management productivity committees tend to be the firms that do not make use
of the various practices and policies.16
low level utilisation of these pay policies and low level utilisation of the other polices and
practices is consistent with the hypothesis that political factor impinge in a significant manner
on firms' use of profit and gain sharing. It is interesting to note that the coordinate position of
the variable corresponding to a  high level use of job rotation is close to the origin, implying
that its use at this level is relatively independent of the levels at which other practices and
policies are used. This is consistent with the view developed above that institutional factors
have a considerable bearing on the use of this practice.
 An examination of the third and fourth axes, relative to the first, tends to confirm the general
lines of the above interpretation of the French case. The distinct clustering of the profiles
corresponding to the non-use of the various practices is still apparent. The coordinate
positions of the profiles corresponding to a low level use of profit and gain sharing are
consistently close and  are relatively distant from the others. Finally, the profile corresponding
to a high level use of job rotation is not well distinguished along the third and fourth axes. The
interpretation arguably should be qualified, though, in observing that the profiles
corresponding respectively to a low and high level use of skill-based pay and compensation
for suggestions are quite close along all four axis. This suggests that where internal company
policy dominates over the impact of political and institutional constraints, which is the case
for these policies, that the sort of coherence observed for the British sample of firms is also
displayed by the French sample.
The Relation between Innovative Capacity and the Adoption of High Involvement Work
Practices
Before attempting to draw general conclusions based on the above characterisations of the
samples of French and British firms, it will be useful to take the analysis one step further and
to consider the relation between the firm's innovative capacity and its the use of high
involvement work practices. Our questionnaire design did not ask for information on the
introduction of new products or processes, and consequently I have approached the issue by
considering to what extent R&D expenditures, a measure of the firm’s willingness to commit
resources to product or process innovation, predict the use of high involvement work
practices. The justification for this model specification is that expanding workers’ skills and
involving them in such arrangement as quality circles and project teams can increase the value17
added from R&D expenditures by promoting the kinds of synergy and exchanges of
information between the firm’s R&D, production engineering and production services that
contribute to successful innovation.
In order to test this hypothesis a ordered logit regression was run predicting a measure of the
intensity of the use of high involvement work practices as a function of R&D expenditures
and two dimensions of the firm’s market strategy: whether or not the firm seeks to diversify
its product range and whether or not it takes financial risks in order to increase its share of the
market. The justification for the product diversification variable is similar to that for R&D
expenditure. Firms which diversify their products will have an interest in adopting
organisational devices that allow them to draw on the full in-house stock of knowledge. If
competition based on such non-price factors as quality and innovation has increased, then a
similar argument can be made for  the link between aggressive pursuit of market share and the
use of high involvement work.
A four-level measure of the use of high involvement work practices was constructed from the
original data presented in Tables 1.2 through 1.5 as follows. A firm involving over 66 percent
of its production employees in two or more of the four practices was ranked a high innovator
and given the value label 3.  Those firms which had not made any use of the practices were
given the value label 0, and those which had made some use of any of the practices but strictly
at the less than 33 percent level were given the value of 1. The remaining value label 2 refers
to those firms which had involved their employees in no more than one practice at the over 66
percent level or which had involved their employees in one or more practice at the 33-66
percent level. While this measure is no doubt imperfect, it does allow to capture variations in
the degree of involvement as well the positive externalities that may exist in using more than
one practice at a time at a high level. For example, the use of job rotation to widen skills will
increase employees’ ability to make useful contributions through their participation in quality
circles or project teams. Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the sample of firm in each
country across the levels of this constructed variable.18
Table 3.1
Measure of the Use of High Performance Work Practices :
Percentage Distribution of Firms by Level
Value label Britain France
0   (none) 14% 16%
1   (low) 37% 27%
2   (medium) 39% 45%
3   (high) 10% 12%
Table 3.2 below presents the results of the ordered logit regressions for Britain and France. In
addition to the predictor variables mentioned above, the model controlled for industrial sector
and for the size of the firm. R&D expenditures as a percentage of turnover were divided into
four categories as indicated in the regression results. DFY is a dummy variable set equal to 1
if the respondent answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether the firm seeks opportunities to
diversify its product range. SHR is a dummy variable set equal to1 if the respondent answered
‘yes’ to the question of whether the company takes financial risks in order to expand its
market share. The industrial sector variable was divided into five categories as presented in
Table 1.1 above, and the size variable was divided into four categories as indicated in the
regression results.
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The most striking contrast between the regression results for the two countries concerns the
coefficients on the R&D expenditure variable. The coefficients are positive and significant for
the case of Britain while they are not significant for the case of France. The results indicate
that a British firm spending between 2.5 to 5 percent of their turnover on R&D tends to be a
more intensive adopter of the new work practices relative to a firm not spending on R&D. The
coefficient on the market share variable is positive and significant for both the British and the
French firms.
                                                
26 In order to remind the reader of how to interpret the coefficients, the reference case is written just below the
indicator variables for each predictor variable. Positive coefficients should be interpreted as expressing
probabilities relative to the reference case. For example, the positive coefficient. 1.48 for R&D expenditures
between 1 and 2.5 percent of turnover in Britain should be interpreted as saying that a firm characterised by this
level of R&D expenditure will tend to use the work practices more intensively relative to a firm which does not
spend on R&D, other characteristics being equal.19
Table 3.2





1-2.5% 1.48** - .24
2.5-5% 2.40***  .66





OTHER -.11   .32
CONSM   .20  -.15
EQUP 1.52*  1.01
INTER 1.41*  1.71*
Reference : SERV
SIZE
1000-2500 -  .36  -.30
2500-5000 -1.31  -.55
>5000 -.96*  -.27
Reference: 1-1000
N 89 128
*** = significant at the .01 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; * =
significant at the .10 level. The variables are defined as follows: RD refers to
R&D expenditures as a percent of turnover; DFY refers to  diversifying  the
product range; SHR refers to taking financial risks to increase market share;
OTHER  refers  to the agriculture and food processing, electricity, gas and
water, and construction and public works; CONSM refers to consumer goods;
EQUP refers to industrial equipment; INTER refers to intermediate goods.
The results also indicate that, relative to the smallest size category, British firms in the largest
size category have a smaller probability of adopting the work practices at a high level, giving
support to the view that very large corporations tend to be marked by greater inertia in their
methods. None of the coefficients on the size variables for France are statistically significant.
As might be anticipated, the intermediate good sectors is likely to be a favourable terrain in
both countries for the introduction of high involvement work practices relative to the service20
sector. The coefficient on the industrial equipment variable for Britain is positive and
significant at the 10 percent level.
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Conclusion
The descriptive statistics presented in the second section of this paper indicate that a greater
proportion of large British companies  have adopted high performance work and pay practices
as compared to large companies in France. Diffusion is less deep amongst  the British
companies, however, in the sense that for a number of key practices or policies the sample of
French firms report involving a larger proportion of their production employees at the 66
percent and over level of utilisation.
The multiple correspondence analysis presented in the third section of the paper can be
interpreted as providing evidence of greater coherence in British pay and manpower policies,
in the sense that more intensive use of the new work practices is associated with more
intensive use of the new pay policies. An explanation for this is that considerable variation in
the use of the pay and work practices in France can be attributed to the way the institutional
environment and legislative regulation impinges on managerial choice. This conclusion is
consistent with the results of the regression analysis which indicate that the use of high
performance work practices in Britain responds more clearly to two key dimensions of
corporate strategy: the level of expenditures on R&D and the aggressive pursuit of market
share.
It is a commonplace that the impact of labour market regulation on the behaviour of
employers is more pronounced in France than it is in Britain. French employers, regardless of
whether they are affiliated to an employers’ association, are obliged to respect minimum pay
levels for occupational categories negotiated with the unions at the branch level. They are
obliged to negotiate pay at the plant or enterprise-level with a local union or unions on an
annual basis. They have multiple obligations in the area of employee representation, including
the requirement to establish comité d’entreprise, to hold elections for the appointment of
délégués du personnel, the obligation establish employee direct expression groups via
                                                
27 The only surprising result for the British case is the negative coefficient on the dummy variable for product
diversification. The coefficient, however, is not statistically significant at acceptable levels.21
negotiations with local union representatives. None of these requirements exist for firms
operating on British soil.
Given this contrast, it is tempting to interpret the results of this paper as providing support for
the view that employers, if left to their own devices, will respond to market selection
pressures by adopting the kinds of work and pay policies that enhance their ability to compete.
Any such conclusion has to be qualified by noting that for the majority of British firms the use
of high involvement practices does not go very deep. This can be interpreted as supporting the
thesis that externalities on the labour market may penalise firms adopting a participatory
organisation relative to their more hierarchical competitors. (See, notably, Levine and Tyson,
1990).
A deeper understanding of the contrast between Britain and France can be achieved by
examining the differences in an historical perspective. The declining performance of British
manufacturers in such sectors as autos, machine tools and other branches of mechanical
engineering during the 1970s and 1980s provoked charges of a ‘British disease’(see Lorenz,
1994 for a discussion and partial survey of the literature).  The severity of the competitive
problems faced by British manufacturers at this time arguably made them more receptive to
changing notions of best practice, and in particular more receptive to Japanese management
technique.
The decision of a number of major Japanese auto and electronic plants to establish affiliates in
Japan in the 1970s, and the rapid increase of Japanese direct investment in the 1980s served to
popularise such methods as quality circles and autonomous team organisation. With export
market shares declining, and long-term employment prospects increasingly dim, both
managers and employees and their unions alike tended to embrace new solutions, and in the
process they transformed many customary practices based on a long tradition of craft-based
organisation.
It is also important to take into account the different starting points of  British and French
producers in interpreting the results of this study. While the traditional British craft system is a
far cry from Japanese methods of total quality management based on autonomous team
organisation, it does share one distinctive feature with the Japanese approach. The traditional
British craft system delegated responsibility to groups of skilled craft workers on the shop-
floor, who retained considerable autonomy in the way they organised their daily production22
activities. The traditional French system of work organisation, based on Taylor’s principles of
scientific management, arguably situated skills at a higher level in the organisational
hierarchy. Given these different starting points, it is not unreasonable to argue that French
producers face a more lengthy learning process in order to master the new methods..
Finally, although the analysis in this text has argued that British producers display a greater
coherence in the way they have adopted high involvement work and pay practices, it cannot
necessarily be concluded that only the British are reaping advantages in the market place.
Even if French employers use of such policies as profit sharing or job rotation are not
motivated in a consistent manner by the imperatives of increasing international competition,
one cannot preclude that increases in productivity and performance are being achieved as an
unintended by-product of their choices.  This question, however, goes beyond the scope of this
paper, which has primarily sought to explore the links between the institutional setting and the
firm’s organisation design and governance structure. This will form the focus of a follow-up
study aiming to more directly explore the relation between high involvement work practices
and various measures of performance.23
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Contributions to the Principal Inertias
Correspondence Analysis for Britain Correspondence Analysis f or France
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4
% of  Inertia 64,51712 15,223305 % of Inertia 25,951084 18,296192 11,877255 8,74172
Contribution Contribution
ROT.1 9,856972 0,290959 ROT.1 8,12385 0,175369 0,095476 1,690064
ROT.2 2,327047 1,043955 ROT.2 3,941351 0,671274 1,549839 10,558808
ROT.3 0,237717 5,019371 ROT.3 2,081178 0,052662 1,899002 1,697984
TM.1 11,328407 1,273352 TM.1 4,574287 0,232027 0,006892 2,037012
TM.2 1,951145 5,34458 TM.2 5,66705 0,048568 1,076918 2,214836
TM.3 0,158267 17,567462 TM.3 1,352821 0,361378 1,585406 0,781404
QC.1 10,872711 1,297539 QC.1 12,762059 0,07675 2,133021 0,469478
QC.2 2,003488 3,049703 QC.2 7,192793 2,727404 9,192959 0,654802
QC.3 0,120029 10,205699 QC.3 3,812275 1,22894 19,376052 0,013727
PRJ.1 10,118685 1,525898 PRJ.1 6,963118 0,19339 0,067979 0,182306
PRJ.2 2,416512 5,727454 PRJ.2 3,077234 0,106958 7,365996 2,575065
PRJ.3 0,015588 21,518972 PRJ.3 2,201551 1,564504 23,277454 3,609795
SK.1 7,193867 0,128377 SK.1 1,399575 0,421808 0,009807 1,009032
SK.2 3,056332 4,304209 SK.2 7,425475 14,940233 4,610973 1,862132
SK.3 1,41179 5,106834 SK.3 2,208415 0,974029 1,784639 16,488729
SG.1 6,173903 0,033567 SG.1 2,475714 0,16239 0,142318 0,219705
SG.2 5,532011 1,854266 SG.2 8,542601 1,333637 5,218835 5,457241
SG.3 0,161624 4,958287 SG.3 0,706946 0,026205 8,84066 10,419219
GN.1 5,859569 0,04159 GN.1 2,120936 1,955001 1,324046 3,325637
GN.2 6,1494 0,647807 GN.2 1,844712 37,139034 3,72416 1,594835
GN.3 0,081343 5,098246 GN.3 5,767372 0,011684 1,010969 8,277893
PFT.1 7,817629 0,001087 PFT.1 1,29715 1,767153 0,813711 12,076291
PFT.2 4,656034 1,840356 PFT.2 2,463514 33,567535 4,872981 1,716904
PFT.3 0,499859 2,12033 PFT.3 1,997962 0,262013 0,019984 11,067122627
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